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NOT LIABLE FOR MEDICAL AND
HOSPITAL SERVICES SUPPLIED BY PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER UNDER INSURANCE PLAN WHERE

DAMAGES-TORTFEASOR

PLAINTIFF INCURRED NO EXPENSE
-SEDLOCK V

TROSPER

In Sedlock v. Trosper,' a recent Kentucky case, the plaintiffs
were Mr. Trosper and his nine year old daughter. The daughter sued
by her father as next friend to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence.
Mr. Trosper, her father, sued in his own right to recover the value of
medical and hospital services rendered is daughter in treating her
injuries, and for other expenses, including time lost from work while
caring for the child. It was established by the evidence that Mr.
Trosper's employer, a coal company, in return for regular monthly
payments in the sum each of $3.80, paid by Trosper, undertook to
furnish the latter and his family with medical treatment and hospitalization, that the child was treated at the company's hospital,
presumably by the company's physicians, and that Trosper incurred no liability therefor except $1.55 per day, that being the
difference between the cost of the room the company had agreed
to supply and the cost of the more desirable room actually occupied
by the child.
Over the objection of the defendant, Trosper was allowed to
prove that the reasonable value of the medical services supplied by
the company was $300, and that the regular fee for a room in the
hospital of the type occupied was $6.00 per day. The jury were.instructed that in the event they should find for Trosper, they might
award him the reasonable value of the medical and hospital services
supplied not to exceed $690. This maximum sum apparently represented $300 medical expenses plus 66 days of hospitalization at $6.00
per day. The jury returned a verdict for Trosper in the sum of $500
upon which judgment was entered. The defendant appealed and the
judgment was reversed.
To explain its action in reversing the judgment, the Court of
Appeals gave the following reasons: "In an action for personal injuries the reasonable value of necessary medical services and hos pitalization is an element of the damage, but recovery may be had
only if the plaintiff has paid for such services or has incurred liability therefor. (Cases cited). These are special damages and their
recovery is purely compensatory. The appellee incurred no expense
as a consequence of the injury to his child other than the extra $1.55
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a day for a private room and the instruction should have limited
recovery for the hospital services to that item.' 2 (Italics writer's)
The Sedlock case is important in that it solves a novel problem
in the law of damages and establishes in Kentucky an exception to
the heretofore almost indisputable general rule that a wrongdoer
may not avail himself of the fact that a plaintiff carries insurance
to off-set or mitigate damages. In so doing the Court reaffirmed the
basic principle of Anglo-Saxon law that all damages other than
those which are exemplary or punitive are awarded to compensate
a plaintiff for loss that he may be made whole.' Unlike punitive damages, sometimes called smart money, which are properly awarded
only in cases of gross wrongdoing, and which partake of the nature
of punishment, compensatory damages serve the sole purpose of
repairing a plaintiff's loss,' That recovery of the reasonable value of
medical and hospital services necessarily incurred as a result of a
wrong is exclusively an item of compensation has never been denied.
When, therefore, the Court of Appeals held in the Sedlock case
that the plaintiff could not recover the value of medical and hospital
services furnished his daughter where his employer was bound to
furnish, and did furnish them without charge under a contract, the
consideration for which consisted of the payment of monthly premiums in return for the risk assumed, it appears that the Court
merely held that there can be no recovery for expenses alleged to
have been incurred as a result of wrongdoing where the plaintiff is
unable to prove that he incurred such expenses. Had the Court allowed the recovery sought by the plaintiff, the effect, considered
from a legal standpoint, would have been to award special damages
of a non-compensatory nature, inasmuch as the plaintiff sustained no
legal detriment caused by the wrong for which he could be compensated. Such a recovery, if permitted, would resemble punitive
damages because the defendant would endure a penalty and the
plaintiff would thereby receive an unearned profit.
The general principle upheld in the instant case that where a
plaintiff has sustained no loss, meaning that he has neither parted
with property nor incurred liability, he cannot recover, has the support of much authority. In Morns v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co..' a Missouri
case, the court held that a plaintiff could not recover the value of a
doctor's services where the evidence did not show that he paid or
became liable to pay therefor. The court said that the case was not
one justifying punitive damages and that the recovery should be
restricted to compensation for loss sustained. Other cases hold that a
mniior may not recover the value of medical services rendered him
-2

Id.

at 375, 211 S.W 2d at 150.
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TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES sec.

,ed. 1920).
Ibzd., 25 C.J.S. DA-AGES-secs. 2-3.
'144 Mo. 500, 46 S.W 170 (1898).
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because it is upon his father that the liability rests.'
Conversely,
where a court was able to find that a minor assumed personal liability he was allowed to recover.' Upon the same reasoning numerous
cases deny recovery for medical expenses to a married woman where
she neither paid for the same nor assumed personal liability, for in
such circumstances her husband, not she, is liable for her necessaries including medical care.' From these decisions it clearly appears that either payment or assumption of legal liability by a
plaintiff is a prerequisite to his right to recover special damages for
medical care.
Had the facts of the Sedlock case been different in certain respects from those actually presented to the court the plaintiff presumably would have been allowed to recover under the rule applicable to ordinary insurance which indemnifies the insured for loss.
Suppose, for instance, that plaintiff's employer maintained no hospital, but had agreed to indemnify the plaintiff for medical and hospital expenses incurred, rather than to furnish medical care itself.
Assuming those facts, upon presenting his child to a doctor or hospital for treatment the plaintiff would have either expressly or by
implication assumed liability to pay for any services rendered. Thus,
the plaintiff could be said to have sustained a legal detriment or
loss occasioned by the defendant's wrong. Under these circumstances the defendant could not successfully contend that the plaintiff had sustained no detriment or loss. Nor could he in order co
avoid liability, avail himself of the fact that the plaintiff had by a
contract, in which the defendant had no interest, arranged to shift
his loss to his employer to be ultimately borne by the latter.'
The result in the hypothetical case above differs from that in
the Sedlock case due to the fact that in the former the plaintiff had
sustained a legal detriment. Therefore, the almost universally accepted principle that a wrongdoer should not secure the benefit of
gratuities received by the plaintiff from third parties or, of benefits
received by him under contract with such persons, should be controlling. This principle is evident in the decisions " and appears reasonable inasmuch as it does not concern the wrongdoer how the
' Hobbs v. Lokey, 7 W W Harrison 408, 183 Atl. 631 (Del. 1936),
Tyrrell Hardware Co. v. Orgeron, 289 S.W 1040 (Tex. 1927)
'Forbes v. Loftin, 50 Ala. 396 (1874), Aubel v. Sasso, 7 Cal. App.
57, 236 Pac. 319 (1925), Judd v. Ballard, 6 Vt. 668, 30 At. 96 (1894).
'Holmes v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 22 Ala. App. 355, 116 So. 323
(1928), Braun v Bell, 249 Mass. 437, 142 N.E. 93 (1924), Carter v.
Witherspoon, 156 Miss. 597, 126 So. 388 (1930), Irwin v. McDougal,
211 Mo. App. 645, 274 S.W 923 (1925), Landskron v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 241 Wis. 445, 6 N.W 2d 178 (1942).
'Pittsburg, C. & S. Ry v. Thompson, 56 Ill. 138 (1870), Cornish
v. N.J. St. Ry., 73 N.J.L. 273, 62 Atl. 1004 (1906)
" Perrot v. Shearer, 17 Mich. 48 (1868), Evans v Chicago
M. & St. P.R. Co., 133 Minn. 293, 158 N.W 335 (1916), Bradburn v.
Great Western R. Co., L.R. 10 Ex. 1 (1874)
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plaintiff disposes of a loss which he has once sustained. Thus where
the plaintiff has either paid or incurred liabiliy for services necessitated by the defendant's wrong cases are almost unammous in
holding that plaintiff may recover regardless of benefits received
from third persons. Examples are numerous. Where a minor received medical services for which he was liable the fact that his
parents paid for the same was held not to bar the child's recovery."
Similarly, where a husband incurred liability for medical services
the fact that his wife may have paid the bill does not bar recovery
by the husband.' Regarding recovery of wages lost due to absence
from work occasioned by a wrongful act, the fact that the employer
continues to pay wages gratuitously does not prevent recovery,
probably because plaintiff sustains a legal detriment in losing the
right to demand wages.' In all these cases the plaintiff has, at least,
sustained a loss recognized by law, even though it be nominal, and
therefore a legal basis exists for compensation.
The Sedlock case differs substantially from those above, for it
would seem the plaintiff, Trosper, sustained no loss or detriment
whatever with the exception of the $1.55 per day for a private room
for which damages were allowed. Upon submitting his child to the
care of the company hospital and its staff the plaintiff could be certain that no liability could be imposed upon him for the promised
treatment. The fact that the plaintiff paid monthly premiums in return for the employer's promise to render such services cannot be
regarded as an expenditure or loss for which the defendant's wrong
was responsible because the payments were made before the particular wrong occured, and at a time when the particular injury
could not have been foreseen.
McCormick, the noted writer on Damages, apparently takes the
position that a plaintiff should be allowed to recover the value of
medical services necessitated by a wrong even where he has neither
paid nor become liable to pay for the same." Where a husband is
nursed gratuitously by his wife or minor child this position seems
to have some validity since recovery can be justified on the ground
that the husband suffered a legal detriment in being deprived of the
normal services of his wife or child, to which he is entitled by law.
In this sense he can be said to have paid for his care. But as applied to other situations wherein there is, in fact, no legally recognized loss the view of McCormick seems unsound.
The reason given for this position that payment or liability
should not be a prerequisite to recovery is that the wrongdoer should
not be allowed to benefit from the plaintiff's arrangements with
IAubel v. Sasso, 7 Cal. App. 57, 236 Pac. 319 (1925).
'Bartlett v Vanover, 260 Ky. 839, 86 S.W 2d 1020 (1935).
152 S.W 303
' Moon v. St. Louis Transit Co., 247 Mo. 227,
(1912), Quigley v. Pennsylvania R.R. 210 Pa. 162, 59 Atl. 958 (1904).
"McCoRmIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES sec. 90 (1935).
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third persons in which arrangements the defendant has no mterest.5
While this may be true in instances where it appears that the plaintiff sustains a loss or detriment which is ultimately borne by others,
it is submitted that, where by reason of the plaintiff's arrangements
with third parties prior to the wrong complained of, medical services
themselves are furnished him without expectation of payment, all
loss to the plaintiff is before its inception prevented. There is
nothing for which the plaintiff can be compensated as he incurred no
medical expenses at any time as a result of the wrong. Thus, as applied to a situation of tins kind, McCormick's reasoning seems to
ignore the fundamental principle that compensation is for a legal
detriment incurred, and conversely, where there is no detriment suf6
fered there is nothing whatever for which to compensate.'
The fact that in a layman's sense of the word the wrongdoer
"benefits" from the fact that the plaintiff carried a peculiar type of
insurance which, unlike other insurance, prevented expense, instead of reimbursing the plaintiff for expenses incurred, can only
be regarded as incidental. To say with reference to the Sedlock case
that the wrongdoer "benefits" from the fact that he need not compensate for a loss which has not accrued or, to put it differently, that he
benefits by the fact that he need not pay what in law he does not
owe, is in its very essence a legal absurdity and contradiction. When
the principle that the wrongdoer should not benefit from acts of
third parties is limited in is application to cases wherein the plaintiff
sustains, as a result of the wrong, an initial detriment or loss which
he shifts to others, it does not conflict with the principle of compensation, and seems both reasonable and meritorious. But to decide
a case wherein it does not reasonably appear that the plaintiff sustained a legal detriment upon that principle is, in theory, to abandon
compensation, substituting in its place punishment for the wrongdoer and unearned enrichment for the plaintiff. Despite tins fact
decisions awarding damages in the latter situation have made inroads upon the principle of compensation and have, although it is
not admitted by the courts, increased the scope of punitive damages.
Examples are those cases holding that there may be recovery for
wages lost, or for loss of time although the plaintiff's employer continues to pay wages during ins disability pursuant to a contract to
do so. 7 In such cases the plaintiff is neither deprived by the wrongful act of his wages, nor of the right to demand them. Those courts
which explain the result on the ground that recovery is for lost time,
not wages, and that therefore the fact that wages are' continued
does not bar recovery, indulge in obvious subterfuge in that the
value of the time of one regularly employed must naturally be the
' Ibid.
8
"Morris v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co. 144 Mo. 500, 46 S.W 170 (1898),
City of Waco v. Diamond, 46 S:W 2d 1049 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
"Nashville C. & St. L. Ay. Co. v. Miller, 12 Ga. 453, 47 S.E. 959
(1904), Mo. P.R. Co. v. Jarrard, 65 Tex. 560 (1886)
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value of the wages he would have received, i the absence of special
circumstances. The usual proof in such cases is proof of the wages
the employee received when on the job.
Although the decision in the Sedlock case appears to deal correctly with the question whether expenses not incurred are recoverable in that it denies profits and strictly adheres to the principle
that damages in such cases are compensatory, yet it is apparent that
the wrongdoer incidentally enjoys under that decision the protection of the plaintiff's contract without contributing to its cost.
Whether that is inequitable is a question which should be considered.
One view is that there is no substantial injustice in the result because the wrongdoer's protection arises only as an incident of a contract made by the insured solely for his own benefit, and from which
he cannot be said to have received less than that for which he contracted. Such insurance is not ordinarily purchased by the insured
in anticipation of securing profits in case of tortious injury, but as
protection against financial loss from injury or illness, resulting from
any cause whatever. That being true, it is submitted that the decision
in the Sedlock case will not discourage subscriptions to this type of
insurance, whereby the medical services themselves are supplied,
simply because the unique character of the plan renders profits in
the rare event of tortious injury impossible of attainment. The insured who has been protected by his contract to the full extent of
his financial misfortune should not complain that it has not made
him rich. On the other hand, the wrongdoer did not purchase the
insurance, nor did he cause the insured to purchase it, and it may
be contended, therefore, that he should not be compelled to pay its
cost.
If the legislature should decide that the problem is sufficiently
important to merit legislation, and that the wrongdoer should share
with the insured the cost of the insurance it might so provide. One
solution might be a statute providing that the plaintiff may, where
this type of insurance is present, recover from the wrongdoer the
aggregate amount of all premiums paid prior to the injury, not to
exceed the value of the medical services necessitated thereby, and
less the value of all previous benefits received by the plaintiff under
the policy. Obviously, however, a statute providing for this sort of
equitable apportionment of the insurance cost would greatly increase
the. complexity of proof, and might place an unreasonable burden
upon the courts.
The Sedlock case is interesting not only because it reaffirms the
fundamental principle of compensation in an uncompromising manner, but because it offers a precedent for the solution of the damage
problem in other controversies of the same type which must eventually appear in the courts. Apparently the question in the principal
case is the first of its kind to have arisen in connection with the effect upon the insured's rights against a wrongdoer of medical and
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hospitalization plans wherein the insurer agrees to furish treatment
rather than to reimburse the insured. While these plans are greatly in
the minority in the field of insurance many are in existence, and it
is not unlikely that their numbers will increase. Whether other
courts will follow Sedlock v. Trosper is at present a matter of conjecture, but the answer should not be long postponed.
NORRIS W REIGLER.

